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This article studies the effect of domestic observers deployed to reduce irregularities in voter registration in a new
democracy, and in particular, the response of political parties’ agents to these observers. Because political parties
operate over large areas and party agents may relocate away from observed registration centers, observers may
displace rather than deter irregularities. We design and implement a large-scale two-level randomized ﬁeld
experiment in Ghana in 2008 taking into account these spillovers and ﬁnd evidence for substantial irregularities:
the registration increase is smaller in constituencies with observers; within these constituencies with observers, the
increase is about one-sixth smaller on average in electoral areas with observers than in those without; but some of
the deterred registrations appear to be displaced to nearby electoral areas. The ﬁnding of positive spillovers has
implications for the measurement of electoral irregularities or analysis of data collected by observers.
F
ollowing the third and fourth waves of democ-
ratization of thelate twentieth and early twenty-
ﬁrst centuries, an overwhelming number of
countries in the world today elects its leaders. In
these new democracies, popular elections are fre-
quently marked by fraud and irregularities (Simpser
2010), which affect public conﬁdence in democracy
and regime legitimacy (Birch 2008; Elklit and
Reynolds 2002; Rose and Mischler 2009), political
participation (McCann and Domı ´nguez 1998), and
protest and political violence (Eisenstadt 2002). For
both historical and contemporary cases, the question
of how informal practices of ballot stufﬁng, registra-
tion fraud, and other electoral malpractices are
eliminated is now central to the study of democra-
tization (Ziblatt 2006), which had earlier focused on
changes to formal rules like the extension of the
suffrage or the development of responsible and
limited government. An emerging body of scholar-
ship on democratization and new democracies argues
that the extent of electoral fraud is affected by
political competition (Lehoucq 2003; Simpser
2010), electoral rules (Birch 2007; Lehoucq and
Molina 2002), socioeconomic inequality (Ziblatt
2009), the quality of the electoral management body
that organizes and conducts the elections (Elklit 1999;
Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Hartlyn, McCoy, and
Mustillo 2008; Pastor 1999), and scrutiny by interna-
tional election monitors (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012).
The fundamental difﬁculty with the study of
election fraud is its measurement—it may take many
forms and those involved typically wish to hide these
illicit activities. Scholars generally rely upon assess-
ments by election observers to measure electoral
fraud for quantitative cross-national studies and use
media reports and petitions ﬁled by aggrieved parties
for single-country studies (Lehoucq 2003). But these
measures are generated by participants with different
interests, expectations, and standards across elections
(Kelley 2012), which raises concerns about consis-
tency and bias. Moreover, politicians may respond to
the possibility of detection by observers or media by
engaging in fraud at alternative locations or earlier
stages of the electoral process that are less likely to be
detected (Bjornlund 2004; Carothers 1997), much as
police and other crime-ﬁghting measures have spill-
over and displacement effects on criminal activity
(Bronars and Lott 1998; Di Tella and Schargrodsky
2004). Consequently, current measures used in cross-
national studies may underestimate the extent of
electoral fraud in new democracies, including those
thatappeartohavefairlycleanelections.Thisunderlies
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292the need for substantial caution about the robustness
ofempiricalﬁndingsinthisemerginglarge-n literature
(Birch 2007).
This article studies empirically the strategic re-
sponse of political parties to civil society actors’
efforts to detect and deter misconduct ahead of a
closely contested election in a new democracy. More
speciﬁcally, we design and implement a randomized
ﬁeld experiment to examine the causal effect of
domestic election observers on the extent of irregu-
larities in voter registration conducted over a 13-day
registration period in advance of the 2008 Ghanaian
general elections. We directly address the aforemen-
tioned measurement problem and the violation of the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA,
Rubin 1978) implied by the possible displacement
of irregularities using a two-level randomization
design. This design enables us to detect, and indeed
we ﬁnd, localized and general spillover effects that are
consistent with evasive responses by the political
parties to the observation effort of the Coalition of
Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) in Ghana.
Rather than deterring irregularities entirely, observers
displace a substantial portion of irregularities to
nearby unobserved registration centers in a pattern
consistent with communication among political
party agents. The effects of these observers and the
estimated extent of irregularities are substantial,
buttressing Birch’s (2007) concerns.
We focus on voter registration for two reasons.
First, problems with voter registration are quite
common in transition elections and new democra-
cies, and this can create signiﬁcant doubts about
electoral outcome and the legitimacy of the new
government. The 1991 general elections in Nepal,
the ﬁrst free elections in that country in over 30 years,
were held using a register in which the number of
registered voters exceeded census estimates by about
10–15% (Gaige and Scholz 1991, 1056). Similarly, the
Philippine general elections in 1998 were run by an
electoral commission that refused to ‘‘reorganize old
voter lists or issue identiﬁcation cards, thus leaving
the door open for so-called ‘‘ﬂying voters’’ (i.e., those
who vote more than once)’’ (Case 1999, 474).
Substantial problems with the voter registration
process and the resulting voters register also marred
the 1993 elections in Senegal. There were numerous
claims of discrimination against opposition support-
ers in the provision of voter cards and an estimated
30–50% of voter cards had factual errors which could
prevent people from voting. Moreover, ‘‘public per-
ception’’ that the incumbent government had abused
the system of documents that allowed people whose
names did not appear on the register to vote ‘‘was
undoubtedly the single most harmful issue in terms
of eroding public conﬁdence in the integrity of the
elections’’ (Villalon 1994, 178).
In more serious cases, voter registration problems
may cause elections to be delayed and possibly not
held at all. Accusations of fraud and violence around
voter registration in 2008, for example, eventually led
to the postponement of parliamentary elections in
Yemen from 2009 to 2011 (AFP 2009; Yemen Times
2009). Similarly, the election crisis in Co ˆte d’Ivoire in
late 2010 was presaged by the inability of the govern-
ment and opposition to agree to procedures for voter
registration. This led to the dismissal of both the
Electoral Commission and the government, a delay of
the highly anticipated ﬁrst election since the end of
the civil war, and deadly demonstrations (RFI 2010;
Zamble ´ 2010).
Second, political parties have strong incentives to
inﬂate the voters register with their own supporters,
even where they are unable to fabricate elections
results outright or to widely intimidate voters and
opponents, which is precisely where the election
would likely be characterized as ‘‘free and fair.’’
Political parties can skew the results in their favor
on election day by enabling multiple-voting or add-
ing premarked ballot papers to ballot boxes, without
obviously pressuring a voter or restricting his access
to a polling station. The risk to this strategy, however,
is that if the number of votes cast as a proportion of
registered voters appears suspiciously high, public
scrutiny and legal and political challenges will follow.
To beneﬁt from the extra votes then, a party must
ensure that extra names appear on the voters register.
Consequently, incentives to rig elections become
incentives to inﬂate the voters register, and moreover,
to evade the scrutiny of observers while doing so.
Organized political parties should then have party
agents avoid the registration centers where observers
are located and instead try to inﬂate the register at
nearby unobserved registration centers.
Our study is sited in Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa
because it shares with many other partial democracies
political and institutional characteristics that are
expected to affect politicians’ incentives to engage
in electoral malpractices (Birch 2007; Hartlyn,
McCoy, and Mustillo 2008).1 It has a majoritarian
electoral system and an electoral commission that is
ofﬁcially independent but underresourced. Like many
1What we label partial democracies are sometimes called hybrid
regimes, semidemocracies, and anocracies, among other terms
(Collier and Levitsky 1997; Epstein et al. 2006; Schedler 2002).
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developing country with a large, poor, rural popula-
tion, where resources are concentrated in the state—
conditions that are frequently associated with vote
buying and other electoral malpractices (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005).
Furthermore, Ghana has signiﬁcant experience
with both international and domestic election ob-
servers who, as in other countries, have historically
focused on election day activities and may have
pushed malpractices by political parties to the
preelection stage. Indeed, there is prima facie evi-
dence of inﬂation of the voters register. In 2008, the
Electoral Commission expected to register 800,000
voters, the estimated number of citizens who had
attained voting age since the previous registration.
However, the Electoral Commission registered nearly
2 million new voters, a ﬁgure signiﬁcantly greater
than the vote margin in the previous presidential
election and for a provisional total number of regis-
tered voters greater than the estimated adult popula-
tion of Ghana. Some but not all of these unexpected
1.2 million registrations were people mistakenly re-
registering instead of requesting a replacement for a
lost voter ID card. However, in several constituencies,
the two main political parties traded accusations of
transporting supporters to have them illegally register
to vote (Boateng 2008).
Our contribution is threefold. First and most
immediately, we shift the focus in this literature on
electoral misconduct to the preelection stage. We
demonstrate and quantify sizable irregularities in
voter registration in a country that is considered a
‘‘model’’ new democracy 16 years removed from its
transition from autocratic rule. To our knowledge,
our work is the ﬁrst large-scale experimental study to
examine preelection irregularities and to work with
domestic election observers. It complements related
work by Hyde (2007) with election day international
monitors and the extensive qualitative reporting on
election fraud by domestic and international election
observers supported by organizations such as the
Carter Center, National Democratic Institute, and the
European Union.2 Our work also adds to the liter-
ature on statistical methods to detect problems with
election results (Mebane 2006; Myagkov, Ordeshook,
and Shakin 2009).
Second, we consider explicitly how political
parties are organizations that cover a wide geograph-
ical area and create connections across political units,
and we study the implication that interventions on
illicit political activities will have spillover effects. We
ﬁnd evidence for such interference across spatial
units, but also conclude that the spillovers are limited
by geographical distance. Our work adds to the
handful of recent studies in political science that have
explicitly considered spillovers, such as Nickerson’s
(2008) experimental study of peer effects on turnout in
an American election.
Third, this research contributes to a growing
body of scholarship that uses randomized ﬁeld
experiments to study how democracy works in
practice in speciﬁc developing countries and clarify
debates and generalizations from observational stud-
ies (Collier and Vicente 2010; Humphreys, Masters,
and Sandbu 2006; Olken 2010; Wantchekon 2003).
Our experimental study reinforces Birch (2007)’s
concerns about the robustness of ﬁndings from
large-n empirical studies that measure fraud using
observer reports. These include most obviously stud-
ies on the causes and consequences of electoral fraud,
but also those on the relationship between election
quality and democratic development (Lindberg
2006). Our work also suggests greater circumspection
about the efﬁcacy of observers in reducing electoral
irregularities (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012) and points to
future research on how fraud is organized and on the
relationship between preelection fraud, election day
problems, and postelection rigging.
We proceed by ﬁrst presenting our hypotheses on
observers, party agents, and voter registration. We
describe the voter registration process and the 2008
general elections in Ghana, then present the exper-
imental design, data, and analysis.
Observers and Party Agents
What is the effect of domestic observers on the
behavior of political party agents and the extent of
irregularities in voter registration? The basic premise
is that political parties want to win the election and
want to appear to do so cleanly. If the parties intend
to inﬂate the vote total in their favor on election day,
they may wish to inﬂate the register with their support-
ers and at the same time do not want their agents to be
caught doing so. Therefore, observers should, in fact,
deter party agents from organizing logistics for frau-
dulent registrations at the registration centers that the
2The National Democratic Institute has monitored more than 270
elections (http://www.ndi.org/content/elections), and the Carter
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on registration at the registration centers to which they
are deployed the primary effect. This logic implies the
following hypothesis: A registration center with an
observer should have a lower increase in registration than
registration centers without observers (negative primary
effect).
However, two additional effects are possible.
Political parties are concerned with voting and voter
registration over a wide area composed of many
registration centers and political party agents often
transport their supporters in vans and buses. Party
agents can often communicate with one another and
travel fairly easily to avoid a particular registration
center with an observer. However, time and resource
constraints imply that not all deterred registrants
would be relocated to alternative registration centers
and whether there is a registration center nearby
would affect the extent of this relocation. Conse-
quently, some portion of the extra registration
deterred by an observer may simply be displaced to
nearby registration centers, which we call a localized
spillover effect. This implies a second hypothesis: A
registration center with a nearby observed registration
center should have a larger increase in registration than
registration centers far away from observed registration
centers (positive localized spillover effect).
The second possible effect is that observers may
deter extra registrations in the constituency overall,
not just at the registration centers to which they are
deployed. The presence of these registration observers
may become widely known and give the impression
that the constituency overall is being observed, so
that observers may also have a negative general
spillover effect.
We interpret the primary effect as a lower bound
on the extent of irregularities in voter registration
enabled by political party agents, since observers
likely do not deter all problems at the locations they
visit. However, observers might affect registration
through alternative mechanisms that would compli-
cate this interpretation. First, citizens who know that
an observer is present at their local registration center
may feel less intimidated by possible trouble and
become more likely to register to vote. This would
attenuate the primary effect of an observer on the
visited registration center, and consequently, also
implies that a registration center with a nearby
observed registration center may not experience a
lower additional increase in voter registration.
Second, electoral ofﬁcials might also become either
more efﬁcient in carrying out their duties or more
diligent and slow down the registration process. If the
effect of observers comes through the inﬂuence on
electoral ofﬁcials, the expected primary effect of
observers is unclear, and as in the case of inﬂuence
on citizens, a registration center with a nearby
observed registration center should have a lower
additional increase in voter registration. However,
electoral ofﬁcials who see registration observers at a
registration center could report this up the chain of
command, affecting the behavior of their counter-
parts at other registration centers, so that there may
be a general spillover effect. We check these alter-
native mechanisms following our main analysis.
Voter Registration and the National
Election in Ghana 2008
Ghana is a former British colony and is an ethnically
and religiously diverse country of approximately
23 million on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa,
bordered by Co ˆte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Burkina Faso.
The Akans, who are concentrated in the more
prosperous southern parts of the country, are the
largest ethnic group in Ghana, but they are composed
of many distinct subgroups that together do not
comprise a majority of the population.
Ghana has a history of cycles of coups d’e ´tat and
military rule, but it has held regular, competitive
elections every four years since its transition to
democracy in 1992. Direct elections are held con-
currently for president and a unicameral national
parliament, which is composed of 230 members
elected by plurality from single-member districts.
The winning candidate for the presidency must win
a majority of votes cast, with a run-off election
between the top two vote getters if no candidate
wins a majority in the ﬁrst round. The then incum-
bent military ruler, Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, was elected
the ﬁrst president of the Fourth Republic in 1992 and
then reelected in 1996 on the platform of the Na-
tional Democratic Convention (NDC). Rawlings left
ofﬁce in 2000 after the constitutional limit of two
terms, and his party’s presidential candidate was
defeated by John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party
(NPP) in a very close election. Kufuor was reelected
in 2004, and there was no question that he would
leaveofﬁcein2008followinghistwoterms.Since1992,
the NDC and NPP have been the two major parties
in Ghana and both parties compete in local-level and
national-level elections throughout the country. The
NDC and NPP consider themselves left-leaning and
right-leaning,respectively,andeachisstronglyidentiﬁed
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2005; Nugent 2001).
I no r d e rt ov o t ei nG h a n a ,av o t e rm u s tg ot ot h e
particular polling station associated with his residence
and present his voter ID card which should have a
photograph taken at the time of registration if a camera
was available; no other form of identiﬁcation is
required. The electoral ofﬁcial compares this card with
the information and photograph printed on the voters
register before allowing the person to vote. While
international borders are closed around election day
to prevent Togolese, Burkinabe ´, and other foreigners
from entering the country to vote, internal roads are
left open, and someone who wishes to vote in multiple
locations on election day could easily do so as long as
he is registered at those multiple locations.
Citizens of Ghana may register to vote only
during designated registration periods, only in per-
son, and only at particular registration centers asso-
ciated with the polling station and electoral area for
their residence. Someone who wishes to register to
vote must declare his or her name, address, parents’
names, and home area, and the electoral ofﬁcial will
ﬁll out this information on a registration form. The
registrant is photographed if a camera is available,
and the photograph is attached to the form, covered
by a sticky plastic sleeve and becomes the ofﬁcial
voter ID card.3 Like the United States and several
other former British colonies, Ghana does not have a
national ID card system and electoral ofﬁcials have
no means to check a registrant’s identity, so that it is
fairly easy to declare false information. Electoral
ofﬁcials may remind the person registering that the
penalty for giving false information or registering
multiple times is up to a year in prison, but almost no
one is ever prosecuted for false registration.4
Voter registration was delayed several times due
to a controversy around a summary of the 2006
voters register, as well as due to supposed delays in
procuring equipment, release of funds from the
government, and hiring of qualiﬁed temporary staff.5
Voter registration ﬁnally began on 31 July 2008, with
only one day’s advance notice. Although each of the
approximately 4,800 electoral areas in the country
was expected to have a registration workstation, only
about 2,500 workstations were available. The regional
Electoral Commissioners distributed equipment and
registration materials at each regional headquarters to
district-level Electoral Commission ofﬁcials, who
transported them and distributed them at the district
ofﬁces to temporary staff hired by the district ofﬁce.
The district-level Electoral Commission ofﬁcials then
drew up the plans for which electoral areas would
have registration centers on which days. Conse-
quently, no advance information was available cen-
trally on where the mobile registration workstations
would be located on which dates. In at least one
region, the distribution of equipment and materials
among the numerous districts was haphazard and did
not follow any formula that considered the size of the
districts.6 As in previous voter registration exercises,
the political parties actively ferried people to registra-
tion centers.7
On the last day of the scheduled 11-day registra-
tion period, the Electoral Commission extended
registration by two days due to widespread reports
of shortages of materials and equipment. The Elec-
toral Commission of Ghana then processed all the
registration forms at its headquarters in Accra and
produced a provisional voters register. By law, this
provisional register must be made available during an
exhibition period, during which an ofﬁcial from the
Electoral Commission sits with the provisional voters
register at particular locations (usually one central
location in each electoral area) so that voters can
check for their names. Objections to any names on
the register may be lodged with the Electoral Com-
mission at this time. Approximately 0.4% of new
registrations were challenged in 2008, which is 10 times
t h er a t eo fc h a l l e n g e sa g a i n st new registrations in 2004,
and this provisional list was cut down to a ﬁnal list of
approximately 12.5 million voters. In Ghana, the voters
register is vetted for deceased voters or others who
should not be on the register only during this period
between production of the provisional and ﬁnal voters
registers.
3The Electoral Commission describes this process as ‘‘lamina-
tion’’ but the plastic sleeve is not heated or melted; it is only self-
adhesive.
4A prominent exception is the case of Pius Opoku Boateng, who
came under heightened scrutiny as the NDC parliamentary
candidate for Kwabre West constituency and was sentenced to
12 months in prison for double registration (Alhassan 2008).
5Meeting with Deputy Electoral Commissioner David Kangah, in
Accra, Ghana, July 2008.
6Observation by research assistant at regional Electoral Commis-
sion headquarters, 30 July 2008.
7An NDC agent and a taxi driver independently reported to a
domestic registration observer in Trobu-Amasaman constituency
in Greater Accra Region that, prior to the observer’s arrival, NPP
pick-up trucks conveyed people from nearby villages to the
registration center. Similarly in Ningo-Prampram constituency
in Greater Accra Region, a domestic registration observer
reported that both NDC and NPP were bussing people to
registration centers.
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7 December 2008, but no candidate for president
won a majority of votes cast. The presidential run-off
election took place as scheduled on 28 December
2008 in all areas except opposition NDC-leaning Tain
constituency, where there was a shortage of ballot
materials. The incumbent NPP initially sought a
court injunction to stop this last election in Tain,
but withdrew the challenge and boycotted the
election on 5 January 2009. The opposition NDC
won the presidency, with a ﬁnal ofﬁcial vote margin
of less than 50,000 votes.
Research Design
In consultation with the Coalition of Domestic
Election Observers (CODEO), we selected four of
the 10 regions of Ghana for this study: Ashanti,
Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra, and Northern Regions.
The leadership of CODEO, an umbrella group of 34
major and many smaller civil society organizations
coordinated by the Ghana Center for Democratic
Development (CDD-Ghana), was willing to adjust
some of their plans in order to learn about the
effectiveness of their activities. CODEO did not place
any restrictions on our choice of regions, and we
selected these four regions in order to cover a wide
range of constituencies within our resource con-
straints, including several incumbent NPP strong-
holds, one in which the 2004 parliamentary contest
was won by the NPP candidate by a 69-point margin;
competitive constituencies; and several opposition
NDC strongholds, one in which the 2004 parliamen-
tary contest was won by the NDC candidate by a
50-point margin. Approximately 54% of the
Ghanaian population lived in these four regions as
of the last census in 2000, and they contain 116 of
the 230 constituencies and 2,204 of the approxi-
mately 4,800 electoral areas (ELAs, which are sub-
units of constituencies).
Randomization
Because observers tend to go to locations that are
more accessible, are conveniently located to the last
observed location, and are likely to have problems
with voter registration, it is difﬁcult to determine
what portion of any observed difference in voter
registration outcomes should be attributed to the
presence of observers and what portion to differences
in underlying characteristics, even in the absence of
spillover effects. We substantially reduce concerns
about confounding by adopting an experimental
approach and randomizing which electoral areas
should be observed.
In order to examine spillover effects, we used a
two-stage randomized design with blocking in the
ﬁrst stage in a design similar to Miguel and Kremer
(2004). As noted earlier, these spillovers are forms of
interference across units, a violation of the stable unit
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1978).
A simple comparison of means of registration be-
tween treatment and control electoral areas will
therefore be a biased estimate of the primary effect
of a registration observer, even if the assignment of
observers to registration centers is randomized. Con-
sequently, we design our experiment to explicitly take
into account the possible strategic response of polit-
ical parties in a way that allows us to detect both
localized and general spillover effects.
First, within each region, we divided constituen-
cies into blocks according to the difference in vote
share won by the NPP candidate and the NDC
candidate in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Parlia-
mentary constituencies are political units which are
not the same as administrative districts for which
government data is made public, and at the time of
the experiment, population and other data were not
available at the constituency level. Consequently, we
blocked only on the 2004 elections results in order to
improve the efﬁciency of our estimates. Within each
block, one constituency was randomly assigned to be
a treatment constituency and two others to be control
constituencies, so that there are competitive constit-
uencies as well as stronghold constituencies for each
party among both our treatment constituencies and
our control constituencies. Although all regions were
available for randomization, as CODEO’s mission is
to organize observers to improve the quality of
Ghanaian elections, a small number of constituencies
in some regions were not available for randomization
and exposure to the two-thirds probability that they
would not be observed. Those constituencies desig-
nated neither treatment nor control were made
available for visits by other CODEO observers not
participating in the experiment.
In the second stage, we randomly selected ap-
proximately 25% of the electoral areas in each of the
treatment constituencies to be visited by registration
observers, which generates random variation in the
number of treatment electoral areas in the neighbor-
hood of an electoral area, conditional on the total
number of electoral areas in the neighborhood.
Although we were aware that there would be fewer
deterring or displacing electoral irregularities 297registration workstations than electoral areas and that
some electoral areas would share workstations, we
conducted our randomization over the list of elec-
toral areas from the 2006 election because the
location of the registration workstations were to be
determined by local Electoral Commission ofﬁcials
and unavailable ahead of time.
Our randomization procedure classiﬁes electoral
areas into one of three groups: control electoral areas
in 26 control constituencies, control electoral areas in
13 treatment constituencies, and treatment electoral
areas in those 13 treatment constituencies. In the
estimation we take into account this design through
the inclusion of the full set of block ﬁxed effects and
correction of standard errors for clustering at the
constituency level (Bruhn and McKenzie 2009; Duﬂo,
Glennerster, and Kremer 2007).
Registration observers were recruited from
CODEO member organizations that would ordinarily
ﬁeld registration observers, were trained together by
one of the authors and CODEO leaders, accredited
by the Electoral Commission as regular observers,
and deployed at the same time. The registration
observers were instructed to go to their assigned
constituencies, ﬁnd out where and when the registra-
tion centers would be open, and then visit unan-
nounced only registration workstations in the
electoral areas on their list. They were instructed to
visit all the electoral areas on their list at the
beginning of the registration period before revisiting
the registration centers once (mostly in rural areas)
or twice (mostly in urban areas) more during the
registration period.
Registration observers stayed at each registration
center for about 1–2 hours on each ﬁrst visit and up
to a full day in the later visits. In Ghana, observers are
not permitted to assist or interfere with the proceed-
ings, although they may interact with the party agents
and electoral ofﬁcials at the registration center. The
registration observers were asked to ﬁll out a one-
page checklist with questions such as whether the
registration center was open upon the observer’s
arrival, whether it had a workstation, whether it
was well-marked and easy to reach, whether there
had been any violence, whether the registration
center had been forced to close at any time, whether
any people the observer thought were ineligible (e.g.,
underage) had been registered, and whether any
people the observer thought were eligible had not
been permitted to register. Registration observers
were directed to fax back these checklists to the
CODEO secretariat every couple of days or whenever
they were in an urban area and had access to
telephones/fax lines.8 CODEO ofﬁcials read these
reports and released one general press statement
during the registration period and one at its
conclusion.9
Data
We use a combination of data from our experiment
and ofﬁcial sources for our analysis. We gained access
to the ofﬁcial number of registered voters at the polling
station level in 2004 and 2008 and compiled these into
electoral area-level ﬁgures. We use whether an observer
ﬁled a report for the registration center for a particular
electoral area as our measure of whether that electoral
area was visited by a registration observer.10
We digitized the Electoral Commission’s map of
constituency boundaries. We also geocoded the 868
electoral areas in our experiment as points by
comparing the names of the polling stations located
within those electoral areas with publicly available
printed and digital maps, data from the 2000
population and housing census, coordinates from
GPS we deployed with some of the registration
observers, and on occasion, information given by
local electoral ofﬁcials (Figure 1). We used ArcGIS to
calculate the distance between all pairs of electoral
areas and construct variables that indicate the num-
ber of electoral areas in a 5 km radius in the same
constituency, number of electoral areas in a 10 km
radius in the same constituency, distance to nearest
electoral area in the same constituency (km), number
of electoral areas assigned registration observers in a
5 km radius in the same constituency, number of
electoral areas assigned registration observers in a
10 km radius in the same constituency, and distance
to nearest electoral area assigned a registration observer
(km). These variables are summarized in Table 1.
We also used these geocoded electoral areas to make
small adjustments to the constituency boundaries so
that electoral areas identiﬁed and located by matching
polling station names with other sources actually fell
within the boundaries. Neither population ﬁgures nor
previous elections results were available at this level of
disaggregation.
8For previous elections, CODEO trained their registration ob-
servers to address these issues in a one-to-two-page written
report rather than on a preprinted checklist with space for
descriptions of any incidents. These observers were free to select
which electoral areas to visit.
9We cannot use CODEO data to investigate effects of the treatment,
because these have no information for the control electoral areas.
10Replication data are available at: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/
dv/nichino.
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We check our randomization procedure with differ-
ence in means tests for the baseline covariates across
our three levels of assigned treatment (Table 1). We
ﬁnd that the density of electoral areas in the
neighborhood and the baseline number of registered
voters in the electoral area in 2004 are similar across
the three levels of assigned treatment. We also
regress these pretreatment variables on the constit-
u e n c y - l e v e la n de l e c t o r a la r e a - l e v e lt r e a t m e n ti n d i -
cators and the full set of block ﬁxed effects (Table 2).
We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on the treatment
variables are not statistically signiﬁcantly different
from zero.11
In three of our four regions, the baseline number
of registered voters in 2004 does not differ signiﬁ-
cantly between treatment and control, nor with
electoral areas in constituencies not selected for the
FIGURE 1 Ghana, with Treatment and Control Constituencies and Electoral Areas
11We also formally compare the distribution of the constituency-
level vote shares for the two major parties in the previous
presidential election with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We
cannot reject that the distributions of NPP and NDC vote shares
are the same for the whole sample (p 5 0.745), among treatment
constituencies (p 5 0.879), or among control constituencies
(p 5 0.918).
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constituency in Greater Accra Region, which was
assigned to treatment, had approximately 82,000
registered voters in 17 electoral areas, while the two
control constituencies in that block had approximately
110,000 and 140,000 registered voters distributed over
ﬁve and eight electoral areas, respectively.
Analysis
We examine the effect of registration observers on
voter registration using the percentage increase at
the electoral area level between 2004 and 2008 as the
outcome, to take account of the different baseline
numbers of registered voters in different locations.
The percentage change in registration from 2004 to
2008 has a mean of 0.257 with a standard deviation of
0.115. Registration data is also available for 2006, but
we do not use this data because of problems with
voter registration numbers for 2006 that were found
in 2008 and addressed by the Electoral Commission’s
Kangah Commission Report. This commission found
that in several government (NPP) stronghold con-
stituencies the number of registered voters had
doubled between 2004 and 2006. This only became
clear after our randomization, and ﬁve of the 12
constituencies in Ashanti Region selected for our
experiment were among those that had nearly double
the number of registered voters in 2006 as in 2004.
Therefore, we focus on the change between 2004 and
2008.
TABLE 2 Regression of Pretreatment Variables on Treatment Assignment
(1) (2) (3)
# Registered # Electoral # Electoral
Dependent Variable: Voters in 2004 Areas in 5 km Areas in 10 km
Treatment constituency (Tc) -45 (569) 0.472 (0.435) 0.619 (1.119)
Electoral area assigned registration
observer (T)
-102 (236) -0.071 (0.377) 0.204 (0.483)
Block Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.333 0.335 0.358
N 868 868 868
OLS. Disturbances clustered at the constituency level; robust standard errors in parentheses. Thirty-nine clusters.
TABLE 1 Means of Variables by Treatment Assignment Status
Assignment Status Difference
Tc 5 1 Tc 5 1 Tc 5 0 (a)–(b) (b)–(c)
T 5 1 (a) T 5 0 (b) T 5 0 (c)
Pretreatment Variables
# Registered voters in electoral area in 2004 1899 2189 1799 -290 (375) 390 (252)
# Electoral areas in 5 km radius in same constituency 2.94 3.32 2.79 -0.38 (0.45) 0.53 (0.29)
# Electoral areas in 10 km radius in same constituency 7.53 7.84 7.22 -0.31 (0.78) 0.62 (0.53)
Distance to nearest electoral area in same
constituency (km)
3.79 4.25 4.31 -0.46 (0.82) -0.06 (0.87)
Spillover Variables
# Electoral areas in 5 km radius assigned
registration observer
0.75 0.84 0 -0.091 (0.137) 0.844 (0.041)
# Electoral areas in 10 km radius assigned
registration observer
1.95 2.16 0 -0.213 (0.230) 2.16 (0.00)
Distance to nearest electoral area assigned a
registration observer (km)
8.34 6.89 41.34 1.45 (1.00) -34.45 (1.53)
Standard errors in parentheses. N5868 electoral areas.
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To investigate the full model, including the localized
spillover effects of observers, we estimate the
following:
Yij ¼b0 þ b1Tij þ b2Tc
i þ +
d












b6d   Tijndij
  
þ mb þ eij
ð1Þ
Yij is the percentage change in the number of
registered voters from 2004 to 2008 in electoral area
j in constituency i, Tij is an indicator for whether an
observer was randomly assigned to electoral area j
in constituency i during the registration period in
August 2008, Tc
i is an indicator for whether an
observer was assigned to any of the electoral areas
in constituency i during registration, and mb indicates
block ﬁxed effects. Our variable for capturing local-
ized spillovers is tdij, the number of electoral areas in
constituency i assigned to treatment within distance d
of electoral area j in constituency i. ndij is the total
number of electoral areas within distance d of
electoral area j in constituency i.
As noted earlier, the stable unit treatment value
assumption (SUTVA) is violated in a world with
spillovers, and ignoring these spillovers will result in
biased estimates of the primary effect. Since an
electoral area that has neighboring ELAs that are
treated is also always in a treatment constituency,
the neighborhood treatment variables (tdij) are pos-
itively correlated with the indicator variable for
the treatment constituency (Tc
i ). Therefore if the
effect of the neighborhood treatment variables (tdij)
is nonzero and they are omitted from the model, the
variable Tc
i is endogenous. If we assume that there is
no interaction effect between Tc
i and the neighbor-
hood treatment variables tdij so that the coefﬁcients
on Tc
i *tdij are zero, then we can determine the
direction of the bias resulting from the omission.
Since the correlation between the neighborhood
treatment variables tdij and Tc
i is positive, the sign
will be determined by the true coefﬁcients of the
neighborhood treatment variables. Under our hy-
pothesis of positive localized spillover effects, there
will be an upward bias, and if the true primary effect
is negative, a speciﬁcation that excludes the neigh-
borhood treatment variables (tdij) will lead to a
coefﬁcient that is closer to zero (and potentially
insigniﬁcant) because of this upward bias. In the
more complex world in which there is feedback
among treatment ELAs, so that the coefﬁcients on
Tc
i *tdij are not zero, the neighborhood treatment
variables are still correlated with the treatment ELA
indicator T even after the effect of the constituency-
level treatment Tc has been partialled out. Establish-
ing the direction of the bias in this case is more
difﬁcult as it would require knowledge of the cova-
riances of the variables with each other. In either case,
excluding the neighborhood variables from the model
speciﬁcation will lead to biased estimates because of
the SUTVA violation.
While our randomization procedure guarantees
that all electoral areas within a constituency have an
equal probability of being selected for treatment,
electoral areas do not all have the same probabilities
ex ante of being assigned a particular number of
treated neighbors because some electoral areas are
more centrally located than others. In practice, treat-
ment and control electoral areas within treatment
constituencies have the same number of treated
electoral areas in the neighborhood on average
(Table 1), but the randomization procedure does
not guarantee that the density of treatment in the
neighborhood of an electoral area will be uncorre-
lated with other characteristics of electoral areas, such
as population density, distance to roads, and other
local characteristics, that may affect voter registra-
tion. Therefore, our model also includes ndij, the total
number of electoral areas in constituency i within
distance d of electoral area j in constituency i, which
will capture all these aspects that are unrelated to
treatment, for which tdij might proxy. As noted
earlier, electoral areas are geographically coded as
points, and both t and n are computed as counts of
points that fall within a particular distance d of the
given point.
If registration observers deter registration in the
electoral areas they visit but these deterred registra-
tions are displaced to nearby electoral areas, then
b1 , 0 and b3d . 0. We use d 5 0005 to denote
electoral areas within a 5 km radius and d 5 0510 to
denote electoral areas located between 5 km and
10 km from a particular electoral area. We also add
interaction terms between the treatment indicator
Tij and tdij and between Tij and ndij in some
speciﬁcations.
Table 3 presents our results, with Column 3
reporting results for the main OLS speciﬁcation.
Allowing the effect of a registration observer in a
nearby electoral area to vary with treatment status
and deﬁning ‘‘nearby’’ as a 5 km radius of the electoral
area, we ﬁnd that within treatment constituencies,
electoral areas with registration observers have an
deterring or displacing electoral irregularities 301approximately 3.5 percentage point smaller increase in
registration than electoral areas without registration
observers. At the same time, a registration observer
visiting a nearby electoral area results on average in an
approximately 2.7 percentage point greater increase in
r e g i s t r a t i o n .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h edisplacement of
some of the registration deterred in the visited electoral
areas to nearby electoral areas which experience a
greater registration increase than otherwise. Note that
we do not detect the primary effect of observers (T) or
a general spillover effect (Tc) in the model without the
neighborhood variables (Column 1).
In addition to this displacement or localized
spillover effect, we detect a general spillover effect
TABLE 3 Effect of Registration Observers on Percentage Change in Registration from 2004 to 2008,
5km/10km
Dependent Variable: Percentage change in number of registered voters from 2004 to 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




+ -0.003 -0.036 -0.036
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024)


























































V* # Electoral areas in 5–10 km





# Electoral areas in 5 km 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
# Electoral areas in 5–10 km -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
T* # Electoral areas in 5 km 0.003
(0.007)
T* # Electoral areas in 5–10 km 0.002
(0.005)
V* # Electoral areas in 5 km -0.003
(0.009)
V* # Electoral areas in 5–10 km -0.001
(0.008)
Block ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.166 0.193 0.193 0.159 0.193 0.192
N 868 868 868 868 868 868
Disturbances clustered at the constituency level; robust standard errors in parentheses. Thirty-nine clusters.
+ p , 0.10, * p , 0.05,
** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001.
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level. The coefﬁcients on the constituency-level and
electoral area-level treatment indicators have the
same sign, and the estimate of the former (c b2)i s
0.041, with a p-value of 0.086 in the OLS speciﬁca-
tions. These results imply that an electoral area
assigned a registration observer, but with no electoral
areas assigned registration observers in a 5 km radius
(Tc 5 1, T 5 1, t0005 5 0; henceforth we omit the
indices i and j for simplicity), has on average an
approximately 7.6 percentage point smaller increase
in registration than an electoral area in a control
constituency (Tc 5 0, T 5 0, t0005 5 0). This average
difference shrinks to 5.9 percentage points if an
electoral area in the 5 km neighborhood is assigned
a registration observer (Tc 5 1, T 5 1, t0005 5 1) and
to 1.4 percentage points for an electoral area without
a registration observer but with an electoral area in
the 5 km neighborhood assigned a registration observer
(Tc 5 1, T 5 0, t0005 5 1). For the speciﬁcation in
Column 3, we reject the null hypothesis of no treat-
ment effect, H0: b1 5 b2 5 b3d 5 b4d 5 b6d 5 0, in a
two-tailed test with F(8,38) 5 8.20 and a p-value of less
than 0.0001.12 We also reject the null hypothesis of no
primary or general spillover effect, H0: b1 5 b2 5 0, in
at w o - t a i l e dt e s tw i t hF(2,38) 5 4.82 and a p-value
of 0.014.
We use our randomized assignment to treatment
as an instrument for whether an electoral area was
visited by a registration observer (Vij) in Columns
4–6 of Table 3. Early August is the end of the rainy
season in southern Ghana and still the middle of the
rainy season in northern Ghana, and the registration
observers noted difﬁculty traveling on many rural
roads and crossing rivers. Moreover, there was some
confusion surrounding the schedule of which regis-
tration centers would be open on a given date.
However, compliance was generally very good
(Table 4) and consequently there are only small
differences between our OLS and IV estimates.
We check for robustness by estimating equation (1)
at other distances (4 and 8 km, 6 and 12 km), including
the log number of registered voters in 2004 as a control
and using the log number of registered voters in 2008 as
the outcome with the 2004 ﬁgures as a control, and the
results remain substantively the same. In general, the
estimated primary ITT effect of registration observers
(c b1) is about -4% and the estimated localized spillover
effect (c b3d) is greater at shorter radii, which is
consistent with a displacement of potential registrants
away from an observed registration center to closer
alternative registration centers. The results also do not
change substantively when we include an additional
‘‘ring’’ (d 5 1020, for example) to consider the effect of
registration observers in electoral areas further away.
We also estimate equation (1) without Tc but with
constituency ﬁxed effects instead of block ﬁxed effects,
and the results for the primary and spillover effects of
observers remain substantively the same (not shown).
As an additional robustness check, we use the
distance to the nearest neighboring treatment electoral
area instead of the number of treatment electoral areas
in a certain radius. We regress the percentage change
in registration from 2004 to 2008 on the constituency
and electoral area level treatment indicators, the
inverse of the distance to the nearest neighboring
treatment electoral area (ðdT
ijÞ
 1), its interaction with
the constituency-level treatment indicator variable,
and the full set of block ﬁxed effects:
Yij ¼b0 þ b1Tij þ b2Tc
i þ b3 dT
ij




    1
þmb þ eij
ð2Þ
We expect the effect to be larger the closer the nearest
treatment electoral area, since distance raises the cost
of visiting another registration center. We use this
transformation of the distance measure to allow for
this effect to diminish more rapidly at closer dis-
tances than at greater distances. We also restrict the
sample to electoral areas whose nearest neighbor
treated lies at less than the maximum distance for
electoral areas in treatment constituencies (54 km)
for this analysis.
With this set up, the estimated coefﬁcient on the
inverse of the distance to the nearest neighboring
treatment electoral area for electoral areas in treatment
constituencies isb b3 þ b4 ¼ 0:042 with a p-value of
0.028, while the coefﬁcient on distance for electoral
areas in control constituencies (c b3 ¼ -0:148)i s
statistically indistinguishable from zero with a p-value
of 0.490. The estimate for b1 is -0.10 (with a standard
error of 0.012) and the coefﬁcient on the constituency-
level treatment indicator (c b2) is estimated to be -0.016
(with a standard error of 0.018). The estimated
coefﬁcient on the constituency-level treatment indica-
tor (c b2) is smaller than our estimates for equation (1)
reported in Table 3 because it effectively incorporates
12We also use randomization inference (Fisher 1935; Rosenbaum
2002) to test the exact null of no treatment effect, H0: b1i 5 b2i 5
b3di 5 b4di 5 b6di 5 0, for the intent-to-treat analysis using radii
of 5 and 10 km. Using the F-statistic from the actual experiment
and the randomization procedure from the experiment to
generate the null distribution based on 10,000 randomizations,
we reject the null in a two-tailed test with an exact p-value of
0.03.
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ment electoral area between electoral areas in treatment
and control constituencies. In another robustness check,
we use the negative log of the distance to the nearest
neighboring treatment electoral area as an alternative
measure, and the substantive ﬁndings remain the same
(not shown).
To get a sense of the magnitude of the treatment
effects that includes all localized and general spillover
effects, we perform the following calculation. We set
all the treatment variables (T, Tc, and the number of
electoral areas assigned registration observers in
0–5 km and 5–10 km (td)) and all the interaction
terms involving those variables to zero and then
predict for each electoral area the percentage change
in registration using the results from the baseline
regression of Table 3, Column 3. Using this predicted
percentage change, we calculate the predicted absolute
change in registrations for the electoral areas in our
sample. These estimates suggest that there would have
been 4,600 more registrations in the 13 treatment
constituencies in the absence of our treatment. If we
assume that the estimates of the treatment effects
apply to the whole country and that these effects
remain the same once the experiment is scaled up (i.e.,
we treat 25% of electoral areas in each of the 230
constituencies in Ghana), then we can also quantify
the Ghana-wide effect: because our treatment constit-
uencies contain about 5.3% of all registrants in Ghana
in 2004, extrapolating the effect from the 13 constit-
uencies implies an estimate of 87,000 fewer registra-
tions as a consequence of a scaled-up treatment. We
must be very careful to note, however, that the
constituencies in our experiment were not a represen-
tative sample of all Ghanaian constituencies, and also
that the above calculation assumes, somewhat unreal-
istically, that increasing the total number of electoral
areas and constituencies treated does not affect the
magnitude of the primary or the spillover effects.
Overall, we ﬁnd robust evidence that registrations
are deterred at treatment electoral areas and in
treatment constituencies more generally. However,
some of this reduction in registration is negated by
displacement to electoral areas that are close to
treated electoral areas.
Citizens and Electoral Officials
We revisit two alternative mechanisms by which
registration observers might affect registration, which
could complicate our interpretation of the effect of a
registration observer on the electoral area s/he visited
as a lower bound estimate on registration irregu-
larities most likely enabled by party agents.
First, registration observers might affect registra-
tion by inﬂuencing the behavior of citizens who may
feel less intimidated and become more likely to
register. We believe that this is unlikely because of
the confusion around the schedule and logistics of
the registration exercise, as well as the unannounced
nature of the registration observers’ visits. Interviews
with district-level Electoral Commission ofﬁcers in-
dicated that equipment problems sometimes forced
registration centers to be merged and their locations
changed with little notice.13 This mechanism cannot
account for the positive localized spillover effects
presented in Table 3. Moreover, this mechanism
would lead us to underestimate the extent to which
extra registrations are deterred by observers, so that
the interpretation of our estimate as a lower bound is
still valid.
A second possible mechanism is the inﬂuence of
registration observers on the behavior of electoral
ofﬁcials. To investigate this mechanism, we con-
ducted a survey of electoral ofﬁcials posted in the
electoral areas during the exhibition of the provi-
sional voters register in October 2008. All electoral
areas that were selected for treatment during the
registration period and approximately 30% of the
remaining electoral areas from both our treatment
and control constituencies were randomly assigned to
be visited by observers during the voter register
exhibition period. None of the registration observers








Treatment constituency, treatment electoral area 77 65 84%
Treatment constituency, control electoral area 199 24 88%
Control constituency, control electoral area 592 1 99%
13Telephone interview by research assistant, Greater Accra Re-
gion, July 2009.
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tion observers were involved in evaluating their own
effectiveness.
These exhibition period observers conducted a
survey of electoral ofﬁcers and any party agents
present about voter registration in that area and
asked for provisional registration numbers. These
observers completed surveys of electoral ofﬁcers in
304 electoral areas (of which six are missing infor-
mation needed to identify the constituency or
electoral area). Unfortunately, the district-level Elec-
toral Commission ofﬁcers hire a large number of
temporary staff for these national-scale exercises, and
many of the ofﬁcials posted during the exhibition
period were not the same as those posted during the
registration exercise.14
Although ofﬁcially a registrant does not need to
present ID in order to be registered, approximately
60% of exhibition-period electoral ofﬁcials who
reported that there were observers at the registration
center in their electoral area in August asked for ID.
A nearly identical proportion (56%) of these electoral
ofﬁcials who responded that no observers visited
during registration also responded that identiﬁcation
was requested of registrants. Local electoral ofﬁcials
frequently expounded upon their creative solutions
to shortages of registration forms and malfunctioning
registration equipment in order to accommodate the
unexpectedly large number of people who turned out
to register. Registration observers therefore likely had
very little effect on the behavior of electoral ofﬁcials
in ways that depressed registration. As with the
citizens mechanism, it is also difﬁcult to imagine
that ofﬁciousness would account for such a large
positive localized spillover effect.
Registration observers might alter the behavior of
electoral ofﬁcials in other ways, however. Electoral
ofﬁcials who see registration observers at a registra-
tion center could report this up the chain of
command, affecting the behavior of their counter-
parts at other registration centers. This is in accord
with the ﬁnding of no difference in registration increase
between electoral areas with and without registration
observers in the model without the spillover variables
(Column 1) and with the general spillover effect
found in the full speciﬁcation (Column 3) in Table 3.
However, we have no direct evidence to support this
contention, and by itself, this cannot account for the
ﬁnding of positive localized spillovers.
The estimated primary effect of registration ob-
servers on registration (c b1), taking into account
localized spillover effects, may then be interpreted
as the effect of registration observers through their
inﬂuence on party agents active during registration.
We do not argue that all registration irregularities
were deterred where registration observers were
present, and we would underestimate the extent of
registration inﬂation if the registration of eligible
voters was also suppressed. Hence, this is an estimate
of the lower bound on the extent of the registration
inﬂation form of irregularities in Ghana in 2008.
Conclusion
This article extends the empirical scholarship on
electoral fraud to the study of misconduct at the
preelection stage. It presents ﬁndings from a random-
ized ﬁeld experiment on the effect of domestic
observers on the extent of irregularities in voter
registration in Ghana in 2008. Our research design
and analysis explicitly take into account the spillovers
that may result from the organization of political
parties across multiple electoral areas and the ca-
pacity of party agents to transport supporters from
one electoral area to another.
We ﬁnd a general spillover or constituency-level
effect; the increase in the number of registered voters
from 2004 to 2008 was on average 4.1 percentage
points smaller for electoral areas in constituencies
with some registration observers than electoral areas
in constituencies with no registration observers.
Furthermore, within constituencies with registration
observers, the increase in registration was on average
approximately 3.5 percentage points smaller in elec-
toral areas with observers than without (primary
effect). However, an electoral area with a registration
observer located within 5 km led to, on average, a 2.7
percentage point greater increase in registration. This
combination of a positive localized spillover effect
from nearby electoral areas with a negative primary
effect is strong evidence that deterred extra registra-
tions are being displaced. Based upon the design of
the experiment, we attribute this effect to the regis-
tration observers’ inﬂuence on the activity of party
agents. Therefore, we interpret the negative primary
treatment effect as a lower bound on the extent of
irregularities.
This research on irregularities in voter registra-
tion has implications for both prodemocracy actors
and scholars of democratization and electoral fraud
14Many school teachers and university students were hired for
registration since they are literate and registration took place
during the school holidays; they were at school in October.
deterring or displacing electoral irregularities 305in partial democracies. As countries like Ghana are
designated ‘‘consolidating democracies,’’ interna-
tional organizations shift their attention and resour-
ces elsewhere, and the role of domestic observers in
protecting the quality of elections grows in impor-
tance.15 Domestic election observers and other
prodemocracy actors may be heartened that a rela-
tively small observer presence had a signiﬁcant
impact in our experiment. But they should allocate
their resources more densely where greater harmful
spillover effects are expected and more towards
registration and other earlier stages of the election
process (Bjornlund 2004; Carothers 1997). Other-
wise, they risk regularly declaring elections with
substantial displaced and hidden fraud as free and
fair and diminishing their credibility and their
potential roles in the democratization process.
Furthermore, our ﬁnding of positive spillovers
has implications for researchers who wish to measure
electoral irregularities or use data collected by ob-
servers. Our ﬁndings suggest that even in a model
new democracy like Ghana, political parties appear to
evade observers, who deter some but displace sub-
stantial irregularities in registration. Although the
magnitude of the primary and spillover effects are
likely to vary for other elections, with the extent of
media coverage of observers’ activities, the difﬁculty
of reaching an alternative registration center, and
political parties’ resources and past experience, the
basic incentive for political parties to inﬂate the
register and to evade observers while doing so should
pertain in elections in other new democracies.
Further investigation of registration and other dis-
placed preelection irregularities for additional elec-
tions and other countries should improve our
measures for election quality and advance scholarship
on electoral fraud and electoral politics in new
democracies.
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